THE QUEST FOR UNITY
Opposition to his ideal did not deter Nkrumah, who advocated Pan-African unity as a guarantee against what he defined as neo-oolonialism or the continued economic dominance of Africa by foreign or the former colonial countries. During Ghana's independence celebrations he sounded the opinion of African guests on the possibility of political union on the continent and took the first step in 1958 when he brought a well-known West Indian socialist and Pan-Africanist, George Padmore, to Ghana to act as his advisor on African affairs and to lead the Pan-African movement in Africa. Padmore thereupon organised a Conference of Independent African States in April 1958. He and Nkrumah expected a strong commitment towards African independence and unity from the eight independent states who attended the conference: Egypt, 1 .ibya, Tunisia, Morocco, Sudan, Liberia, Ethiopia and Ghana. Instead they refrained from any mention of political unity and were satisfied with a vague reference to non-alignment as a base for African foreign policy. Even in Ghana there was doubt about the unity Nkrumah had in mind, as political leaders and civil servants feared the influence it could have had on Ghana's national interests.3 However, the opportunity to discuss world affairs proved attractive and gave the assurance that future meetings would take place. The conference also had another much more important significance: it widened the scope of Pan-Africanism by drawing the Arab states into the fold of a movement that had formerly tended to limit its attention to the Negroes.
December 1958 saw a further advance when the All African Peoples' Conference took place in Accra. It was attended by two hundred delegates representing fifty political parties, trade unions and student organisations from all parts of the continent irrespec tive of their political status. The conference reconfirmed the principles laid down by the Manchester Conference of 1945 and the delegates pledged themselves to a final and co ordinated assault on colonialism and imperialism, including the use of violence if necessary. Much stronger steps towards African unity were also suggested. These included the regrouping of the continent's independent states by the adjustment of existing 'artificial' borders, the amalgamation or federation of certain areas on a re gional basis, and the progressive formation of federations or confederations into an ultimate Pan-African commonwealth and a free and independent united states of Africa. After the delegates heard Nkrumah's opening plea for a strong form of unity such as this, they accepted a resolution asking for the formation of a 'Commonwealth of free African states' and expressed the hope that 'the day will dawn when the first loyalty of African states will be to an African Commonwealth'. 4 Regional governments controlling five federations of North, West, Central, East and South Africa were sug gested and a constitution was adopted providing for an organisation with a permanent secretariat to organise future conferences. A call was also made upon existine inde pendent African states to lead the continent towards the attainment of this goal.
These two conferences were milestones in the quest for African unity. They made Pan-Africanism an exclusive African movement, lead by Africans. The movement then definitely entered the sphere of practical politics, 6 and between 1959 and 1963 various The independent states all confirmed their opposition towards colonialism, imperial ism and racism as well as to the French nuclear tests in the Sahara. They also decided to create an organisation for African economic development and to work towards closer educational, cultural and scientific bonds. Despite this, fundamental differences existed with regard to unity. Ghana and Guinea made a strong case for a political union based upon the Sanniquellie Declaration, but the other delegates were cool about this. Nigeria not only branded the idea 'premature', but warned against leaders who aspired to lead the continent to constitutional unity. This remark was obviously aimed at Nkrumah, who had made himself available for this role during the first All African Peoples' Conference in 1958. Africa's new leaders were clearly unwilling to sacrifice their newly attained political power to anybody.11
This paved the way for the appearance of a separate bloc of conservative states on the continent. This bloc was French-speaking and relied on the mother country for their security, capital, skills and markets. It coincided with De Gaulle's preference for keep ing English influence out of the European Common Market (ECM) which spilt over into Africa and deepened suspicion towards English-speaking Africa. Nkrumah was in creasingly convinced that the former French colonies were mere client states of France and only nominally independent, since he regarded the ECM as an instrument of neo-colonialism. He also opposed their preference for regional groupings, seeing it as a drain on the political power which unity of the continent could bring. Pafmeca became Pafmecsa between 1961 and 1962 when Ethiopia, Somalia, Basutoland, Bechuanaland and black nationalists from South Africa, South West Africa and Swaziland joined the grouping.
The year 1960 was crucial for Pan-Africanism and the quest for continental unity. The pioneers of this ideal managed a clearer definition of its aims and placed the movement on a better organised footing. Its influence on the continent and in world politics was taking shape, and at the United Nations (UN) it became a power bloc putting Africa's viewpoint with growing confidence. But the first cracks in its ranks and ostensible unity were also appearing as more states became independent and their rulers disagreed with the pioneers about the interpretation of African unity and the continent's attitude towards the outside world. These dissidents were the thirteen French colonies and Nigeria. Differences between the groups terminated in blocs of states hostile towards each other. Another bone of contention was border disputes, especially between Came roon and Guinea, Somalia and Ethiopia, Tunisia and Egypt, Togo and Ghana, Nigeria and Ghana, Morocco and Mauritania, and Morocco and Tunisia.
Then came the Congo crisis. The Congolese prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, asked the African states and the UN for aid in ridding the country of the Belgian troops who tried to maintain order in the chaos that followed the granting of independence. The UN obliged and asked African states to make troops available for a task force. This drew these states into the crisis which was worsened when Katanga seceded and resisted efforts to bring it back into the Congolese fold. Lumumba expected greater involvement from the world body, but the UN was hesitant to interfere in the domestic affairs of the country and limited its efforts to helping to rid the Congo of the Belgian troops. A split was also developing between Lumumba and the country's president, Joseph Kasavubu, while Kasavubu and the Katangese leader, Moise Tshombe, enjoyed the support of some of the French-speaking African states.
All of this contributed to making the situation very difficult for Lumumba. He was a convinced Pan-Africanist and these problems convinced him to organise his own Pan-Africanist conference. This was held in Ieopoldville between 25 and 31 August 1960 and immediately created a very delicate situation for the thirteen states that attended. They did not want to antagonise the UN, because they realised that the UN force had to stay in the Congo; on the other hand they did not want to oppose Lumumba. In consequence, they requested Lumumba to cooperate with the UN and confirmed the world body's actions. Katanga was a much harder nut to crack since there was a difference of opinion on how Tshombe's secession was to be handled. Guinea supported Lumumba's demand that Tshombe be deposed, but others were unwilling to commit themselves to such a step. In the end they made no positive suggestions on how to handle the Katangese secession. Uncertainty and mutual dif ferences prevented the independent African states from taking a unified stand. A disillusioned Lumumba then called upon the Soviet Union for aid -a step that put African unity under further pressure because it violated the principle of non-alignment upon which previous Pan-African congresses had laid so much stress. The cracks in Pan-African ranks were widening.
Further developments in the Congo worsened the position. The split between Lumum ba and Kasavubu proved impossible to heal and they removed each other from power. Meanwhile, the UN occupied the broadcasting station in I>eopoldville, using Ghanaian troops and thus preventing Lumumba from addressing the people; Nkrumah took the stance of supporting the Congolese prime minister in public. This was an obvious effort to keep in favour with both parties while the more radical African states, Ghana and Guinea, criticised the UN for not acting against the Katangese secession. At this stage the army under Colonel Joseph Mobutu intervened and stopped the chaos in the Congo, but his action also widened the gap among the African states. Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Egypt and Morocco did not recognise the new Congolese government and continued their support for Lumumba. When the Congolese government sent the Ghanaian ambassador home and requested the UN to withdraw the Ghanaian and Guinean troops, the polarisation between the pro-Lumumba and anti-I.umumba groups increased.
While these developments were in progress, the thirteen French colonies in black Africa became independent. Although the new states were cool towards Fan-Africanism, they realised the value of greater continental unity and after discussing the Algerian crisis in October 1960, they formed a more permanent organisation to guard their interests. In December of the same year, twelve of the new states met at Brazzaville. The Congo and Algerian crises were reaching serious proportions, and at the Brazzaville meeting the new states expressed their support for the UN's actions in the Congo. On the question of unity they preferred closer African cooperation based upon neighbourliness and unity of culture and interests to the advantage of all. No reference was made to the radical kind of unity Nkrumah propagated. The Brazzaville conference had a special significance: for the first time a conference was held to which only a limited and specific group of states were invited. This resulted in the formation of a bloc -the Brazzaville group, also known as the Union of Africa and Malgassy (UAM) -that stood for a policy of mutual cooperation. Their taking of sides in the Congo crisis contributed to the deepening of the split that existed in Pan-African ranks.
African unity was the loser. The states supporting Lumumba suddenly found them selves in the minority; fearing that they were losing their Pan-African initiatives, they began to cooperate in a bloc which enabled them to put their case more strongly. Morocco took the lead and organised a conference at Casablanca early in January 1961. The heads of states of Ghana, Guinea, Mali and the United Arab Republic (Hgypt) attended, as did the foreign minister of Libya and the leader of the provisional govern ment of Algeria. Although the meeting devoted some discussion to imperialism, colo nialism and racism, the Congo and continental unity enjoyed its main attention. Nkrumah pleaded strongly for a union of African states, but even within their ranks there was no real support for this kind of unity. Instead, the conference reconfirmed its confidence in the conferences of independent African states which had been held in Accra in 1958 and in Addis Ababa in 1960, calling upon all to cooperate to create political, economic, cultural and military unity as far as this was possible. To this end they decided to form an African Consultative Assembly and four committees dealing with political, economic, and cultural affairs, as well as an African Supreme Command. These were to meet regularly to deal with affairs of common concern.
These decisions were embodied in the African Charter of May 1961, which was com piled after another meeting in Cairo and was intended to embody the principles laid down at Casablanca. When it took these steps, the Casablanca group became a formal organisation in a wider Pan-African context. It took the process of bloc formation a step further and formed a group that opposed the Brazzaville group in a specific manner.
In spite of this, the Monrovia Conference was the biggest meeting of African states since 1958, and French-and English-speaking states met for the first time to discuss general affairs. The main speakers all stressed some aspect of the unity that Africa desired and needed. Tubman emphasised economic cooperation, Senghor stressed cultural, techni cal and economic instead of political unity, while Milton Margai of Sierra Leone pleaded for a unity that preserved the territorial integrity of each state and a free choice of form of government and kept political ideology intact. After lengthy discussion a number of principles, laid down in a joint communique, were accepted. These included the recognition of the absolute equality of all states; the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states; respect for the sovereignty of each state; and the principle that there should be recognition of the inalienable right of each state not only to exist but to develop its own personality and means of resistance to subversive acts by neighbouring states.14 The acceptance of the principle of mutual cooperation based upon tolerance, solidarity, good neighbourliness and the periodical exchange of ideas was of special importance. The kind of unity these states preferred excluded any form of political unification or integration of their sovereignty, but aimed instead at the unification of aspirations and acts as far as social solidarity and political identity were concerned. In January 1962 these principles were finalised in the Lagos Charter, which gave birth to the Inter-Afri can Malagasy Organisation (popularly known as Ocam), with various management and administrative organs.
The year 1962 was one of polarisation on the African continent. The radical Casablanca group wanted to place the continent on the path to socialism, which they saw as the solution to its economic problems. The African personality was to be cultivated in all walks of life, and the group continued to warn against the dangers of neo-colonialism. The moderate Monrovia group differed on all three these aims and attached much importance to good relations and cooperation with the former colonial powers. The widest and most significant difference, however, concerned the concept of unity. To Monrovia it meant unified aspirations, solidarity and the maintenance of political identity but no political unification on a unitary, federal or regional level. This was the exact opposite of Nkrumah's stance. To him, the future lay in a political union because it held the solution to problems such as poverty, balkanisation, neo-colonialism and mutual aspirations, as well as language and cultural differences. At this stage these differences of approach towards Pan-Africanism resulted in personal quarrels between African leaders. The Nigerian press came out strongly against Nkrumah for his derisive remarks on the Monrovian principles and mocked him for his inability to unite Ghana and Guinea properly. He was accused of seeing himself as a kind of messiah at the head of the whole African continent.
THE FORMATION OF THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY
Paradoxically, despite these bitter differences African states had one important thing in common. All of them felt an urge for some kind of continental unity. It was this feeling that changed the direction of events and made 1963 the year of African unitysomething which hardly seemed possible when the Iagos Charter was issued. During the Iagos meeting, some African leaders were obviously unhappy about this dissent. 1 laile Selassie, head of Africa's oldest independent state, regarded the bloc formation as artificial and called upon the continent's leaders to put away their differences and concentrate on affairs upon which they all agreed. He stressed that he belonged to one grouping only: the African grouping. This evoked reaction from both Ghana and Guinea, who made new calls for cooperation among African states. Throughout 1962 serious discussions at diplomatic level took place at the UN, and visits between various African leaders followed, such as between Haile Selassie and Sekou Toure in Asmara on 28 June 1962. The idea of a summit for all heads of African states was bom. Ethiopia took the lead in organising this and succeeded in gathering the foreign ministers together to prepare for the proposed summit which was to be held at Addis Ababa early in 1963.
During a preliminary meeting, African foreign ministers worked on compiling an agenda and drafted provisional charters on which the heads of state could deliberate. With the charters of the Monrovia and Casablanca groupings and the ideas of Kwamc Nkrumah before them, four perspectives on possible unity crystallised. Libya and Sudan suggested that an African Charter similar to the Declaration of Bandung should be accepted. Ihis would have maintained the position as it had been before the summit. Another group of states favoured the framing of a declaration of principles to create a loose organisation of states within the framework of an African Association, based upon the model of the Organisation of American States. A third grouping regarded such an organic form of unity as premature, and gave preference to economic cooperation which could lead to future unity. Lastly, those who were clearly inspired by Nkrumah insisted on the formation of a union of African states with its own civil service, supreme military command and high court. This confronted the foreign ministers with unsurmountable obstacles and they opted for the way of least resistance. This entailed the circulation of an F.thiopian concept charter for the comments of the heads of state which they would then reconsider at a later date.15 T hirty heads of state gathered in an euphoric Addis Ababa on 23 May 1963. Only Morocco, in protest against the presence of Mauritania, and Togo, because of the assassination of President Sylvanus Olympus, were absent. Strong leaders such as Nasser, Haile Selassie and even Houphouet-Boigny rejected the foreign ministers' suggestion to refer the Fthiopian concept back to the foreign ministers for further consideration. Opening the summit, Haile Selassie told the delegates that their prime task was the creation of a base for unity and that it was his view that they should talk with one voice and make unilateral decisions when and where necessary. This was possible only in a single organisation from which Africa could talk as an entity and in which Africa itself could find solutions to its problems. To accomplish this was the meeting's prime responsibility to the people of Africa.
A variety of views were put forward in the subsequent discussion, but opinions once again polarised reflecting the basic difference that had existed since the quest for unity had begun in 1958. Nkrumah pleaded for a union of states and reasoned that socioecon omic development and cooperation were possible only within this type of political framework. He assured the summit that this would not lead to the political union so many feared. Only Uganda stood by Nkrumah -the majority opposed his suggestion. Sir Abubakar Tafewa Balewa said it was much too early for such a union and placed strong emphasis on the independence and sovereignty of each state. Mutual respect for, and acceptance of, each other's sovereignty and equality were prerequisites for unity; this would be possible only through gradual cooperation in the economic, educational, scientific and cultural spheres. I le stated that it was essential for the Africans to come to know each other properly before a step as drastic as political unity could be contem plated. The spirit of Casablanca and Monrovia was obviously alive and well.
Then Ben Bella of Algeria steered the meeting on a different course. In an emotional speech he called on the delegates each to die in some small way so that African unity could live. He turned their attention towards decolonisation, which all African states favoured, and he called upon Africa's independent states to cooperate in liberating the rest of the continent from the white minority governments in the south. This inspired the meeting with a sense of solidarity and new spirit. One by one, speakers then began to clarify this as Africa's prime task. South Africa and Portugal became the binding factors: unity was found in joint commitment against colonialism, apartheid and racial discrimination. Military and financial aid and boycotts, all aimed at the white south, were suggested, and in this spirit the summit sent the foreign ministers back to draft a charter.
Concessions were necessary and the Casablanca states accepted defensive aspects such as respect for sovereignty, the condemnation of subversion and non-interference for the inclusion of non-alignment, anti-colonialism and the absolute priority of liberation in southern Africa.16 What eventually crystallised was more in accordance with the views of the conservative heads than those of the radical leaders. The Casablanca grouping realised that its view had been rejected and the unity it preferred was undesirable at that stage in the quest for continental unity. They accepted the charter with the promise that closer unification would be discussed at a later stage. On 23 May 1963 the Organi sation of African Unity (OAU) was bom -Africa took a significant step towards the cooperation and unity its leaders so ardently desired, the form of which had been the source of such vastly differing opinions.17 Since the unity that was created rested upon the principles of decolonisation, anti-apartheid and the desire to have a say in world affairs, it was, as one critic put it, built on the negative act of breaking down forces outside its fold rather than an attempt to consolidate itself from within its own ranks.18 From a different viewpoint, the OAU is an organisation that aims at the defence of the territorial and political status quo in Africa. Individual sovereignty was the supreme issue. It made the annual assembly of the continent's heads of state of far greater importance than the arbitrary bodies set up to consider health, education, economic and defence matters.19
THE AIMS, PRINCIPLES AND STRUCTURE OF THE OAU
Charter The charter of the OAU is very similar to that of the UN and some of the principles accepted were taken from the UN charter. It recognised the inalienable right of all people to decide on their own future as well as the principle that freedom, equality, justice and dignity are aims that should be pursued if the legitimate aspirations of Africa's peoples are to be realised. Peace and security should be maintained, sover eignty and territorial integrity guaranteed and all forms of neo-colonialism opposed. Member states are pledged to aspire towards mutual understanding and solidarity.
Aims
Five specific aims were set. The oiganisation devoted itself to promote unity and solidarity among its members; cooperation was aimed at the improvement of life on the continent; the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the African states were to be protected; all forms of colonialism were to be wiped out; and international cooperation was to be promoted within the context of the charter of the UN and the Universal Declaration of I luman Rights. To realise these aims, member states under took to coordinate their policies with regard to the following: politics, diplomacy, economic cooperation including transport and communication, cultural cooperation, the promotion of health, sanitation, feeding, scientific and technical cooperation, defence and security affairs.20 Emphasis was placed on cooperation whereas political unification did not feature at all. With regard to defence matters, Nkrumah's suggestion of an African Supreme Command was also omitted.
Princi-In article III of the charter, seven principles were laid down to govern relations between P|es member states. This is the key to understanding the essence of the OAU. The article affirmed the following: the sovereign equality of member states; non-intervention in the domestic affairs of member states; respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state as well as the inalienable right of each to independence; peaceful settlement Four main institutions and a number of specialised commissions control the OAU, headed by an Assembly of I leads of State and Governments. The assembly meets once a year, or more often if two thirds of the members, which also constitutes a quorum, consider it necessary. This body determines policy and reviews the decisions taken by the OAU's other organs while its own decisions are sent to Africa's governments in the form of suggestions which cannot be enforced upon member states. No disciplinary action can be taken against any member. Each member has one vote and all decisions except procedural measures require a two-thirds majority. Another function of the assembly is the appointment of the secretariat and some of the specialised committees.
The Council of Ministers consists of the foreign ministers of the member states. They have two regular meetings a year, but can be summoned more often when relations deteriorate or crises such as border disputes develop. This makes it the most active organ of the OAU. The council's decisions are generally submitted to the assembly, but in more recent years the council has started to take decisions on its own when important issues are at stake. Like the assembly, it lacks the power to execute its decisions. Another function of the council is the coordination of the organisation's specialised commis sions.
The secretariat consists of an administrative secretary-general with four assistant re gional secretaries and some junior personnel. They form a permanent central body executing all administrative affairs as laid down in the charter. The secretary-general's duties are limited to administration, as the name of his post suggests. The main reason for this is to restrict his power and prevent him from making policy. In fact he must remain neutral -strong proof of the absence of real unity within the OAU. This makes the appointment of the secretary-general every four years a very sensitive affair. In practice he is a puppet and his functions are carefully circumscribed. Special care is taken to prevent him from executing commands from individual states or governments and member states may not misuse him. 11c can react to the OAU's commands only in a strictly neutral capacity. 
THE OAU AND AFRICAN UNITY
After the formation of the OAU, the Casablanca and Monrovia groupings, Pafmecsa and the UAM were disbanded, but the tension between the demands of national sovereignty and the All-African supranationalism which continental unity implied continued to exist. The unity embodied in the OAU charter encountered severe criti cism from Nkrumah and his followers. Political In 1977 the summit realised that lip service to African unity could not prevent the divisions political fragmentation that was paralysing the OAU. Suggestions to reform the secre tariat were made, and these crystallised into a more pragmatic approach in 1978 when a committee to coordinate relations among the OAU's 49 member states was formed. These steps failed; national sovereignty clearly dominated the Pan-African idea while the ideological differences that arose after 1976 pushed the South African issue into the background. Differences about the Cuban presence in the Ogaden, the second invasion of Shaba, and relations between the francophone states and Paris were other bones of contention. In the early eighties the crises in the Western Sahara and Chad demon strated that the divisions were stronger than ever, and in 1982 it proved impossible to obtain a quorum for that year's summit.
Region-From the outset, the creation of regional unity was a possible alternative to the unity °l unify that the Addis Ababa conference had failed to achieve. However, attempts to promote regional unity did not originate as OAU projects, but came from individual statesmen -one of these pioneers was even Nkrumah himself. The Ghana-Guinea-Mali union was intended to be a forerunner of a socialist Union of West African states: something which Nkrumah had dreamed about since his days in I,ondon. This union also failed. Another abortive West African attempt was made by Senegal and French Sudanwhich later became known as Mali. The achievement of Maghribian unity, including Libya, proved to be unrealistic as did the attempt to federate Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda in 1963-1964 . Thereupon Nycrere united Tanganyika and the islands of ZanziTanza-^ar ^cm,a 'n April 1964 and this area became known as the United Republic of njQ Tanzania in April 1965. The mutiny in Tanganyika's army and communist penetration of Zanzibar had much to do with this effort, although it was announced that this move was merely an attempt to bind the historical and cultural links between the two states. The unity that was created in 1965 was very shaky. The Revolutionary Council of Zanzibar retained a substantial amount of sovereignty -thus demanding severe re straint on the part of Nycrere to keep the union together. Despite this, Tanzania far outlived the efforts made in West Africa. After 1972 unity became more binding, and five years later the ruling parties on the island and the mainland merged and a new constitution replaced the temporary one which had been written in 1965. In the new dispensation Zanzibar retained its separate government but started to send repre sentatives to the union parliament for the first time.28
THE WEAKNESS OF AFRICAN UNITY Other
Other dividing factors gradually emerged from the divergent interests of the OAU's ob' member states. T hese crystallised into problems in assembling all the heads of state for stacles ^ sumrnit meeting; a preoccupation with domestic affairs including civil 41 and it dropped to 6 out of 45 five years later. In 1982 the OAU experienced a serious crisis and the summit was postponed twice: as a result of the western Saharan dispute and subsequently, after the crisis in Chad, before it was eventually convened in 1983 in Addis Ababa. This poor attendance eroded the decision making power of the body. Meetings on ministerial level were more successful in removing misunderstanding and in reducing conflict.29
The OAU's inability to act with a modicum of unity is built into its structure, and a powerless secretary-general, with no authority to take decisions, also contributes to this. At best he is a dignified clerk without any political role or relevance"*0 and all suggestions to improve this position are regularly forestalled. In fact appointments to this sensitive post were another dividing factor, because it was strongly contested. Diallo Telli of Guinea first held the position and he was succeeded by a Cameroonian, Nzo Ekangaki. To appoint his successor, W. E. M'Boumoue, also from Cameroon, twenty ballots had to be held, and the position became even worse in 1983 when three candidates contested the position before an acting secretary-general, Peter Onu of Nigeria, previously the assistant-secretary for West Africa, was appointed 31 He held the post until 1985 when Ide Oumarou of Niger succeeded him. Since 1989 Salim Ahmed Salim of Tanzania held the post.
The principle that every independent African state except South Africa could join the OAU was another factor that harmed the body's efficiency. Mauritania was admitted from the outset, despite Morocco's complaints, while Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswa na were allowed to join despite Sudan's objection and their economic dependence on South Africa. Deeper divisions surrounded the admittance of the Saharan Arab Demo cratic Republic despite strong Moroccan opposition. The Polisario Front, who preferred independence instead of the division of the Spanish Sahara between Morocco and Mauritania, enjoyed recognition from 22 members of the OAU.
ATTEMPTS AT ECONOMIC COOPERATION
Economic cooperation was a distinct aim of the OAU, and some African statesmen saw economic cooperation as the most practical way towards the desired continental unity. Julius Nyercrc regarded regional economic groupings as 'stepping stones towards African unity' .32 Organisations for economic cooperation were founded even before the formation of the OAU, and these were more successful than attempts at political cooperation. Some, such as the Equatorial Customs Union (UDE) and the Conseil de 1'Entente, both established in 1959, had limited aims, but the African Development Bank (ADB), whose origin dates back to the All African Peoples' Conference in Tunis in 1960, is among the more successful efforts to create continental cooperation. Twenty states were members of the bank when it started its operations in 1966 and ten years later membership had grown to 39. The bank aims at social and economic development on an individual and collective scale with preference for regional cooperation. It has the power to initiate projects, and by 1974 it had invested R500 million in development projects, while an African Development Fund was established in the same year.
Cus toms
and econ omic unions
The formation of interstate facilities for the economic development of North, East and Central Africa enjoyed the support of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and, in the early sixties, a Customs and Economic Union for Central Africa (UDEAC) started to work towards complete freedom of movement of people, goods, commodities, services and capital in order to coordinate industrial development, trans port and tax systems. By late 1967 the UDEAC was far advanced in realising a general monetary system, one transport system and free movement of capital and people; at this stage two member states, Chad and the Central African Republic, became dissatis fied and, joined by Zaire, they formed the Economic Union of Central Africa (UEAC) in April 1968. The Central African Republic soon became disillusioned and reverted to the UDEAC. Since then both bodies have existed alongside each other; all efforts to recon cile them had failed up until 1980.
Ocam The Union of African and Malagassian Economic Cooperation, another organisation of this kind, was formed in 1964 and was a reconstruction of the disbanded Union of Africa and Malagassy (UAM). It was a definite economic bloc, but its 14 members soon felt that a more politically oriented body would serve their purposes better. The Africa and Malagassy Community Organisation (Ocam) developed from this, and although it lost Mauritania in 1965, Zaire and Rwanda later joined the organisation. It aimed at political, economic, social, educational and cultural ties between francophone Africa and Madagascar within the wider framework of the OAU. Ocam had its own summit of state and governmental heads, a council of ministers, a general secretary and a charter which all pointed to its political orientation. This drew criticism from the OAU which accused Ocam members of greater loyalty towards Ocam than to the OAU and claimed that its existence could stimulate regional economic bloc formation, a step which the UN encouraged. However, by 1967 the OAU's attitude had softened, and its summit began to support regional economic cooperation as a forerunner to a future African Economic Community similar to the European Economic Community (EEC).
OERS
This revised view stimulated existing bodies such as UDEAC and led to the formation of the Organisation of Senegal River States (OERS) in 1968. Guinea, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal joined the OERS and wanted to develop the Senegal River basin for the benefit of all. The agreement also included stipulations on cooperation in commerce and health. Mutual differences, military coups and strong personal differences between Toure and Scnghor brought the OERS to the brink of collapse while the OAU failed to sort out their differences; in 1971 a new organisation, the Organisation for the Develop ment of the Senegal River (OMVS), was established without Guinea, but it too, failed to create the necessary cooperation. Meanwhile Ocam realised that it was trespassing on the area of the OAU and depoliticiscd itself in 1974 by limiting its activities to economic, social and cultural cooperation. I lereaftcr decline set in and, although it still functioned in the 1980s, its members consisted of the small and poorer francophone states who were primarily concerned with linguistic and cultural links.33 
EAEC

CEAO
In West Africa moves towards economic regionalism became stronger after Nkrumah disappeared from the scene in 1966, and as a result of the criticism the ECA directed at the discussions held to form a body based on the EEC a year later. Francophone West Africa was suspicious and interpreted the tentative moves as another ploy to create Anglo-Saxon economic domination. In 1970 they established a West African economic community known as the CEAO which tied up with France and the EEC rather than their English-speaking neighbours. In this region Nigeria, prospering as a result of the oil boom, recovered quickly after the civil war and became the economic giant of the area. With a favourable balance of payments, and from a position of strength compared with its non-oil-producing neighbours, Nigeria began to steer towards a West African economic community. Between 1977 and 1978 the idea of setting up a regional oiganisation in southern Africa gained momentum. Although economic factors played a role in this movement, the South African idea of drawing its neighbouring states -including even the former Portuguese colonies and Zimbabwe -into a constellation of southern African states, points to a clear political motive. In November 1979 the four so-called frontline statesTanzania, Zambia, Angola and Mozambique -attempted to widen their struggle against South Africa by pulling Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi into the battle against South Africa, hoping to wean them from their pro-South African econ omic preferences.37 The prospect of Zimbabwean independence encouraged the forma tion of a regional oiganisation which could work towards loosening economic ties with South Africa: Zimbabwe's strong transport system could serve as the nucleus of a southern African transport system north of the Limpopo River. T his was one of the prerequisites for the realisation of the dream of peaceful development without South Africa. On 1 April 1980 nine states including Zimbabwe, Botswana, I,esotho, Swaziland and Malawi formed the South African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in Lusaka. South West Africa-Namibia adopted observer status in expecta tion of its independence.
The SADCC's aims included four specific aspects. Dependence on South Africa speci fically, but also on all other foreign powers, had to be reduced as soon as possible; ties creating true and equal regional integration had to be forged; the region's sources had to be mobilised to promote national, interstate and regional policy; and coordinated action was to be established to obtain international cooperation within a framework of economic liberation. At its foundation, the SADCC claimed that a new era in regional integration and the liberation struggle in southern Africa had arrived and the SADCC was portrayed as the pioneer of a regional organisation totally different from any comparable African body, especially the ineffective Fast African Economic Community -it claimed that its controlling structure and premises were entirely innovative. Because respect for the national sovereignty of member states was of extreme importance, and it was taken that the SADCC could not dictate economic policy to its members, the creation of a supra-bureaucracy was avoided. Supreme power was vested in the annual meeting of government heads, while a council of ministers and coordinating and specialised committees assisted them. The SADCC's headquarters was in Gaborone, Botswana, and from there a centralised secretariat served the organisation. Individual governments were given help in embarking on various projects and although individ uality was encouraged, six areas were identified where cooperation would take place. These were trade and communication, agriculture, energy, manpower, industrial devel opment and finance.
Because six of the SADCC's members were landlocked states, transport and communi cation was given high priority in an effort to lessen dependence on South Africa as soon as possible. A South African Trade and Communication Commission was formed in Maputo as early as July 1980. Every member state could choose a sector in which it wished to take the lead. Agriculture was another sector which assumed particular urgency in order to reduce dependence on South Africa for food: this became Zim babwe's responsibility. Tanzania became responsible for industrial cooperation, Swazi land for manpower, Zambia for mining, Lesotho for soil preservation, Botswana for health and Malawi for wildlife and forestry. Ihcrc were no SADCC projects, only undertakings which the organisation monitored and coordinated. The SADCC did not envisage a common market of any kind, but tariff walls and the decrease of tariffs and inter-African trade featured among the aspects it intended to consider.
The SADCC was dependent on continued foreign sources for its funding. The Soviet Union and the Arab oil-producing countries remained aloof. The ADB made a contribu tion and the SADCC began its own development fund, while EEC countries and Western aid agencies reacted favourably to the overtures of the SADCC's Iondon liaison office. During 1980, $870 million was pledged for the transport and communi cation project -this money was made available specifically to the countries in which this project was launched. Malawi received money for railway development while Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique were given funds for road building. Three years later the donors were less generous, but pledges relating to agricultural development and industrial cooperation were made by the ADB and the EEC.
There were various factors which inhibited the SADCC's projects in the early years, however. Economic realities imparted a large degree of uncertainty to 'disengagement', conse quently more attention was paid to transport and communication projects and the SADCC 'kept [on] plugging the 1980 line';41 this tempered the ideals of regional integration and economic liberation of South Africa. The implications of regional development, the essential justification for regional cooperation, were significant, how ever. For example, Zimbabwe's intention of developing its Wankie Power Project meant that Zambia had to sacrifice some of its main export, electricity, while Mozambique also had plans to upgrade the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric scheme and export the power to members of the SADCC. Members were equal in status, and regional integration had to be applied with caution because of unfavourable experience in the days of the feder ation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the Portuguese colonial union and the South African Customs Union. Regional integration and development were attractive only when specific benefits were apparent. 
THE OAU AND THE UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMITTEE FOR AFRICA
Even before the establishment of the OAU, the ECA warned the new African states that economic cooperation -at least between close neighbours -was essential for the economic development of the continent.44 When the OAU came into existence a few months after this warning was uttered, cooperation towards improvement of life was among the aims it set for itself. While some of the founding fathers saw economic cooperation as an essential stepping stone towards the desired continental unity, others felt that economic unity was possible only after the broadening of political cooper ation 45 In both cases the OAU failed to achieve any substantial results.
In 1963, the ECA was already busy with plans for African economic development which included the forming of an African Development Bank as was suggested at the second All-African Peoples' Conference at Tunis. The ECA preferred an integrated approach to African social and economic problems, and welcomed the OAU as an ally in the battle against economic and social problems and development. Despite its aim and charter, the OAU was disinclined to involve itself in economic development and concerned itself mainly with decolonisation and anti-apartheid measures, leaving the continent's economic problems to the ECA until such time as the radical and socialist secretarygeneral, Diallo Telli of Guinea, took over. In 1967 he started attempts to get the ECA under the OAU's control. This was largely because of Africa's economic decline and the civil unrest that arose in Nigeria.
Intervention in the affairs of the ECA increased and at the Kinshasa summit of 1967, economic issues featured prominently and a resolution on inter-African cooperation was taken which dearly underlined the link between politics and economic issues. The OAU wanted to end Africa's dependence on the developed countries by creating regional groupings and an African common market. Telli continued to encourage interest in economic affairs by submitting reports on economic and social development to the Counal of Ministers.
In the same year, an important step was taken when 31 African states met in Algiers and adopted the African Declaration of Algiers. All of the non-aligned countries accepted The OAU went one step further in 1969 when the African group at the UN became strong enough to make its voice heard in the world body. This was also significant for the UN's economic policy: the Africans demanded a more decisive say in economic policy. The F.CA was forced to make the OAU a partner in all its plans and projects and this gave the OAU a stronger political voice. The ECA accepted this and saw the new arrangement as one that could benefit Africa. Some of the economic projects came under joint control although the ECA did most of the work. Considerable cooperation existed despite the continued existence of competition, but this alone was not enough to make projects viable. Shortage of manpower, money, and the lack of the political will to succeed also played a role.
During the seventies the OAU became increasingly concerned with the continent's economic state and issued an Economic Charter emphasising the need for economic independence in 1973. This document augmented the Charter of 1963 which set down the political base upon which the organisation intended to function, accepting the desire for economic independence and emphasising the need for economic cooperation as the base for stronger unity. To develop this further, Zaire proposed the creation of an Economic Coordinating Committee for the entire continent and the formation of an African Common Market. Cooperating with the ECA and ADB, the OAU demanded a new Interim Economic Order, and this was put before the UN at a special session in May 1974. The OAU's role in efforts to change the world economy was, however, minimal; Algeria played a more prominent role in this respect. Paradoxically, in 1975 the OAU accepted that the responsibility for Africa's economic growth lay with the African states themselves, but continued to shift responsibility to the shoulders of the UN and the other non-aligned countries. Africa's greatest achievement in her efforts to establish a more just economic relationship with the industrial countries was the Lome Conven tion signed with the Caribbean, Pacific and the nine EEC countries in 1975. In this the EEC made major concessions to Africa,46 but lack of unity in its ranks prevented the effectiveness of the measures.
In the 1970s black Africa's economic position deteriorated when oil prices rose sharply. The OAU tried to enlist Arab support for the continent's ailing economy and an attempt was made to hold an Afro-Arab summit in 1974, but this only came to fruition three years later when the Arab League and the OAU met in Cairo. Sixty countries and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation signed a declaration to cooperate politically and economically, especially in finance, mining, communication and preferential tariffs. More money was made available with the creation of an Arab Bank for the Develop ment of Africa -a move that drew sharp criticism from the OAU's secretary-general who saw no need for another institution similar to the ADB. Many of the Arab undertakings at Cairo came to nothing, and a drop in oil prices in the early eighties indicated that Africa could not rely on the Arab countries for economic aid. At an economic summit in 1 ugos in 1980, another plan of action was devised, which aimed yet again at the attainment of a common market, this time at the end of the twentieth century. This was to be based on Fcowas and the SADCC which were formed at the same time under the OAU umbrella. Emphasis was placed on food production with an eye to self-sufficiency within a decade. Other goals included self-sufficiency in building materials, clothing and energy. Transport and communication were also earmarked for attention. The chances of success here were poor. The OAU was experi encing financial problems and many individual states were importing grain. This in turn had a negative influence on the balance of payments which went into decline during the oil crisis of 1973-1974 and the drop in African export commodity prices from 1977.
Economic problems increasingly occupied the OAU's attention from the mid-eighties. They even pushed the troubles in Chad into the background and after Morocco's withdrawal from the OAU in 1984, the same happened to the Western Sahara. New attempts were made to obtain the F.CA's support at the 1985 summit at Addis Ababa but, at a special meeting, the General Assembly failed to obtain special commitments from the international community. The world body emphasised the necessity of selfhelp and acknowledgement of previous mistakes. There was a general vagueness about Africa's debts, but the continent's need for money was estimated at $130 000 million by 1990. Of this, Africa was expected to find $80 000 million from its own sources. At that point the 1986 summit of the OAU accepted economic restoration programmes inspired by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which had differing effects on various
countries.
Conditions deteriorated as the nett outflow of capital from Africa continued; com modity prices declined further and disappointing contributions from Western powers threw all calculations into disorder. There was increased pressure for a new summit to deal with these debts, and in Africa a difference of opinion developed between the more radical point of view, which favoured a unilateral and collective repudiation of all debts, and a more moderate view, which felt that the debt crisis had not yet reached the point which justified such action.49 It was decided to hold an international conference to find a solution for the crisis. This was confirmed in November 1987, and the ECA and the ADB were saddled with the arrangement of the conference. Only if this did not yield the desired result were more drastic steps envisaged.50
The Western creditor nations did not favour the conference despite their growing concern for black Africa's debts; but renewed pressure followed for this conference. In 1988 African debts reached about $2(X) 000 million before an extraordinary OAU summit accepted a seven-point declaration aimed at the Western creditor nations. It asked for a ten-year suspension of debt service payments; an interest-free rescheduling of debts over a period of fifty years; a transfer of existing bilateral debts into grants; a reduction of real interest rates on new loans, facilitating at least part of the repayments into debtor currency; the lessening of maturity and grace periods on private loans; and T his did not do much to lighten the burden, and more calls for an international summit continued as Africa's debts escalated to 5230 000 million. In 1989 the OAU summit repeated its request for a relaxation of debts, the cancellation of the poorest countries' debts, and easier repayment terms. The ten-year suspension on service payments was repeated, and it was suggested that the 'total maximum level of debt service' be paid as a percentage of exports. Although the request for an international conference received some sympathy from France and the EEC countries, most creditor nations remained unwilling to yield, because they feared the effect this would have on Latin America -a continent which had even greater debts than Africa. The debt problem therefore re mained unsolved when Africa entered the last decade of the twentieth century.52
The effectiveness of the OAU in promoting Africa's interests politically, economically and socially can thus be questioned and criticised. As Prof 1 larry Gailey wrote in 1983: '... the OAU is to Pan-Africanism as the United Nations is to world government. While one can applaud the achievements of both, it would be foolish to assume that they play anything but a secondary role in political decision making.'53 African unity, however, has nothing to do with sterile uniformity or unanimity or successes in international or even African politics and economics. The decisive connection is far more likely that 'profound sense of being African'54 -perhaps this can be offered as an explanation for the survival of the OAU in the turmoil of Africa's independent existence. 
Notes
Africa and world politics
During the decolonisation period, there was an expectancy that Africa would refrain from involvement in world politics since neither the United States nor the Soviet Union, despite strong anti-colonial views, was directly involved in Africa. Independent Africa had also opted for non-alignment -a policy of neutrality in the Cold War which set in between the two superpowers after the Second World War. This stance was unrealistic, however, because Africa's geopolitical or strategic position and its mineral wealth soon involved it in superpower rivalry.
AFRICA AND NON-ALIGNMENT
Non-alignment was a policy formulated by Pandit Nehru, the prime minister of India, which had became independent in 1947. Nehru reasoned that India had nothing to do with the ideological conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, or the Cold War which had evolved from this conflict at about the time India became inde pendent. He refused to associate his country with either of the two superpowers. This did not imply an unwillingness to benefit from the Cold War: as long as India could obtain the much-needed economic aid it desired from the superpowers without becom ing involved in any political ties with either country. To promote this view, India associated itself with the Soviet-American anti-colonial campaign at the UN in an obvious bid to win the support of aspiring black nationalists for the policy of non-com mitment.
Ban dung Con ference
1955
Nehru was soon rewarded from unexpected quarters. In 1948 the Yugoslavian leader, Josip Tito, who differed from the Soviets on the interpretation of Marxism and social ism, changed from international communism to nationalism and non-alignment.1 Nehru's second prominent convert was the Egyptian ruler, Gamal Nasser, who fell strongly under his influence in 1953 when he realised that he could play off the East against the West for his own personal benefit and Egypt's. Egypt was one of the six African countries present at the Bandung Conference held in the Indonesian capital in April 1955. Ihe others were independent Ethiopia, Liberia and Libya while the Sudan and the Gold Coast, soon to become independent, also sent delegates. Although this conference dealt primarily with Asiatic affairs, it took a strong stand against colonialism in order to win the hearts of Africa's leaders for the policy of non-alignment and it became the forerunner of future Afro-Asiatic solidarity.
Bloc of nonaligned states
Although the delegates were divided on the issue of non-alignment, they managed to cast this aside in what became known as the 'spirit of Bandung'; they all accepted non-alignment, which implied a cohesive bloc of Third World nations bent on the promotion of peace, directed against any involvement with either of the two super powers. As Nasser put it: 'We oppose those who oppose us, and are at peace with those who make peace with us.'2 Africa, which attained independence while the Cold War dominated global politics, produced more non-aligned states than any other continent. With the exception of Ethiopia and Liberia, who both preferred a pro-Western stance, the other African states saw greater security outside the two ideological camps. This attitude did not exclude mutual differences and the more radically inclined states leaned strongly towards the Soviet Union because not only was this superpower openly anti-colonial, but it was also anti-European and anti-Western and therefore anti-Ameri can. Moreover many African leaders adhered to the socialist ideology, although there were also those like Gabon who wanted cooperation and aid from Europe and the United States: a view that tied in with the French preference that the new African states should link up closely with the European Common Market (ECM).3 This also had some common ground with the policy of the United States, especially during the Eisenhower presidency, for continued cooperation between the former African colonies and their former mother countries.4
THE SOVIET UNION AND AFRICA
Soviet
The Bandung Conference opened new possibilities for the Soviet Union, despite their interest not being invited to attend the conference. The presence of the six African delegates at Bandung convinced the Soviet leader, Nikita Krushchev, that Africa was a new area of political influence which the Soviet Union could utilise in the struggle against the West. In 1956 he told the Twentieth Party Congress (somewhat belatedly) that the national awakening of the African people had begun and that it was necessary to reconsider the existing Stalinist policy which regarded the nationalist leaders of Africa as bourgeois lackeys of Western capitalism and therefore unworthy of support. 
Grow-
Moscow's attitude was friendly, but its interests in Africa differed from those of the ing re-African states. The Soviets tried to break existing ties between these new states and the merit o» ^Vcst; *n *act ^*cy tried to make things difficult for the capitalist world in general. This Moscow was n°t necessarily in the interest of the African states, whose preference for non-align ment had coloured their decision not to take sides in the Cold War. ITie money the Soviets made available was used to loosen the ties between the new states and the West and also to gain control of their exports. It included the financing of mutually agreed capital projects, meeting the balance on the trading account, and training blacks in the Soviet Union. Soviet experts went to Ghana and Guinea to get a hold on their economies and to win their favour with spectacular projects. But recommended projects such as the collectivisation of communal land in Guinea ran into disfavour, and this caused unrest. Many of the Russian experts were unfamiliar with local conditions and their feasibility studies were ineffective; then too goods, often of poor quality, either arrived late or exceeded what was required. All of this added to a growing feeling of resent ment.
Dete-
But the Soviets themselves had reason for dissatisfaction. Ghana overloaded them with riorasuggested projects and left it to the Russians to sort out the particulars. The ideological kltiorw benefits that the Soviets expected in return for the money they made available were not with fully forthcoming; indeed, the results benefited Ghana more than the Kremlin. Moscow Ghana was an assured purchaser of Ghanaian cocoa and Russian purchases sustained the price of the product when world prices fell. The prominence of Russian advisors soon proved to be unacceptable to many Ghanaians.10 Another bone of contention was that Nkrumah's personal Guard Regiment, which was organised on a healthy budget by the Russians, operated under a separate command after 1962. This caused dissatisfaction in the regular army when lack of funds meant a shortage of material -and subsequently became one of the significant reasons for the coup which pushed Nkrumah from power in 1966. Relations between the two countries rapidly deteriorated. General Joseph Ankrah's new regime was vehemently anti-Soviet. He expelled all but a thousand Relations with Guinea had gradually deteriorated since the days when a lonely Toure, afraid of foreign invasion and desperatdy short of arms, welcomed the Soviet's over tures. Guinea, who was unable to feed its population, needed food and not arms -a situation the Russians seemed unable to comprehend. Self-interest prevailed and besides the one-sided bauxite venture, the Soviets refused to assist Guinea by building a fishing fleet or making any of the catches taken in Guinean waters available to the local population. Although Guinea's overtures towards the Eastern Bloc countries advanced quickly,11 ideological affinity had its limits, and in December 1961 Toure sent the Soviet ambassador home, accusing him of the so-called 'teachers' plot' against his government. This was not the first 'plot' Toure had exposed against his own increasing ly autocratic rule: previously the French and not the Russians had been accused. In all probability the Soviets were involved in unnecessary interference in Guinea's own affairs, and when five members of the teachers' trade union criticised his government, Toure was quick to accuse them of endangering the Marxist revolution in his country and had them sentenced to penal servitude for periods of five to ten years. Toure's position deteriorated as pupils and training college students took to the streets and demanded the death of the president. Although the Soviets sent a deputy prime minister to Conakry to conciliate,12 this did not prevent Toure from turning to a more neutral foreign policy. At a World Peace Conference in Stockholm in 1961, he supported the Chinese against the Russians and he first accepted aid from the United States in 1962.1 lis turnabout took on further proportions when he refused to allow the Soviets to use Conakry's airport, which, ironically enough, had been built by the Russians during the Cuban missile crisis.
The ideological motive also failed to yield results in the Congo crisis of the early sixties. Lumumba conformed admirably with the Soviet requirement for an African socialist, but after he had been removed from power in September 1960, he was killed early in 1961. The Soviets immediately withdrew support for UN measures and threatened to intervene in favour of Lumumba's heir, Antoine Gizenga, who was in revolt against Lumumba's successors in the capital. Only Moscow's West African clients and Nasser gave support; the rest of Africa rallied behind the UN. When Sudan refused the Soviet Union permission to cross its territory to come to the aid of Gizenga's wilting revolt, Gizenga lost his value for the Soviets. In 1965, when the pro-American Mobutu seized power, he closed the Soviet embassy.
Moscow met with greater success in Africa's largest but most anti-leftwing state, Nigeria. The Soviets distrusted the feudal pro-British rulers from the north and sym pathised with the Ibos in the east. They were also against military rule, but soon changed their ideas after their civilian friends in Guinea and Ghana let them down. At least the military seemed to ensure more stability and provided the opportunity of doing business with people who managed to remain in power; this also meant that the Soviets could act against what remained of capitalism. The Muslim north had other virtues. The Kremlin had good reason to be on friendly terms with this region since the Conveniently, the Kremlin detected a capitalist plot in the secession move and gave full support to the northerner, General Yakabu Gowon.
Initial aid was in a non-military economic form, and Lagos accepted loans from the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites. The establishment of a steel industry was the main focus of these professionally conducted negotiations. What made the whole issue remarkable was that this African state was known for its distinct antagon ism towards communism and the supporters of this ideology. In 1968 the Soviets promised a vast credit for the steel project, but when the civil war broke out things changed. Gowon was in dire need of arms which the British and Americans refused to supply. The Soviets grabbed the opportunity and supplied aircraft, piloted by Egyp tians, and heavy artillery which Gowon could not obtain from Britain. In contrast to its previous approach to the African states, the Kremlin did not attempt toexploit Nigeria's difficulties for its own ends. Alexander Romanov, the ambassador who conducted these negotiations, knew that he could not turn Nigeria into a communist or satellite state. Instead the Soviets aimed to befriend this African giant, and within weeks of the outbreak of hostilities Soviet aircraft and Czech arms arrived in Nigeria. The Soviets aimed at, and achieved, limited returns as a more tempered association between the two states emerged. The significance of Moscow's relations with Nigeria lies in the fact that it loosened ideological restraints on the Kremlin's approach to Africa despite the fact that much of the ideological rhetoric remained. The Soviets simply reacted to Nigeria's practical demands.
COMMUNIST CHINA'S IDEOLOGICAL STAKE IN AFRICA
When the Communist Chinese foreign minister, Zhou Enlai, attended the Conference of Bandung in 1955, his country had no formal relations with Africa. Before this new communist power attended the Geneva Peace Conference on the French withdrawal from Indochina in the previous year, Communist China's foreign policy was closely linked to that of the Soviet Union. At Bandung the Chinese communists went out of their way to prove to the other delegates that they were more sensible and amenable than popular opinion would have others believe. They were also anxious to demon strate that their form of communism was reconcilable with Asian nationalism in the light of its preference for non-alignment. In addition, Bandung created an opportunity to make personal contact with African leaders.
Communist China's motives were aimed primarily at the attainment of international recognition for Mao Zedong's regime and support for its membership of the UN where it hoped to replace the Republic of China (Taiwan). After the split with Russia, the Chinese tried to create trouble for the Soviet Union and the conflict between them could be promoted more easily in Africa than elsewhere. This resulted from Communist China's belief that the Soviet Union had relegated them to a junior role in Africa while
Relo tions with Africa
West Africa Zhou Enlai's tour of Africa they were not as anti-American as Beijing expected them to be. The Chinese commun ists even suspected the Soviets of a willingness to sacrifice them in Soviet efforts to improve relations with the Americans. To outdo the Kremlin, the Chinese moved further to the left than Moscow and gave their full support to all of Africa's liberation movements. The more revolutionary these movements were, the better -an uninhibited radicalism which the Soviets distrusted. Initially the blacks welcomed Communist China's anti-colonial voice but, as they attained their independence, Chinese insistence on subversion became less acceptable. The fact that the Chinese portrayed themselves as a non-European power that was also subjected to European imperialism compen sated in some measure for this. To many blacks they were more likeable than the Russians and the Americans, despite the fact that they had less to offer financially and technically.
At Bandung, Zhou Enlai's contact with Nasser paved the way for Communist China's first relations with Africa, and an embassy was opened in Cairo in 1955. In 1956 the Chinese communists recognised Sudan's independence and the opening of a cultural mission there was followed soon afterwards by similar offices in Ethiopia, Morocco and Tunisia. China was the first to recognise the Eront de Liberation Nationale (EI.N) as the provisional government of Algeria. Sudan returned diplomatic recognition only after a coup there in 1959, and there was some discord in Algeria about Chinese aid in their struggle. Eventually Communist China disapproved of the terms of the agreement which brought the war between the Algerian nationalists and France to an end.
In West Africa the Chinese were hot on the heels of the Soviets, and in 1958 they made a particular point of publicising their recognition of Guinea, where there was a sizeable Chinese population. Ghana was recognised in the following year. Financial aid to both Ghana and Mali was much smaller than the Soviet offers had been, no doubt because of the continued economic crises that plagued China until 1961. But Chinese loans were repayable over longer periods and at a much lower interest rate. These grants were mere gestures, however, and when the Cultural Revolution broke out in 1966, only 15 per cent of the total Chinese credits were taken up. During the Congo crisis Lumumba was aided financially and China opposed all UN measures; the power's non-membership of the world body was mainly responsible for this attitude. Lumumba's fall was an obvious setback, which was further aggravated by the switch to Antoine Gizenga, who event ually made peace with Kasavubu. Continued Chinese aid to other rebellious groups had little effect. Ihe foundation of the OAU in 1963 was detrimental to China's support for the liberation movements because the OAU's declared aim was to orchestrate the liberation of southern Africa from within Africa herself.
Beijing had to review the position, and in 1963 Zhou Enlai undertook a extended tour of Africa. He announced specific principles upon which Chinese economic aid, aimed at the promotion of socialism and the destruction of capitalism, could be obtained. This did not prevent a rather cool reception in Cairo, where Nasser expressed himself in terms favourable to the Soviets. Ihe Algerians had been somewhat restrained in their appreciation of Chinese support ever since the war of liberation. Ethiopia was rather cool because of Chinese support for the pro-Chinese element in the Somalian govern- Early in 1964 China's fortunes changed to some extent. This was the result of diplomatic recognition by France, followed by that of francophone Africa (with the exception of the Cote di'Ivoire and Cameroon). Between that year and 1978, the country's diplomatic missions in Africa grew from 15 to 40, but its continued preference for revolutionary groups prevented any smooth development. West Africa's military leaders all dis trusted the Chinese and efforts in 1965 to hold a second Bandung Conference failed because the Wcstcm-orientcd African states saw through Beijing's efforts to be nation alist and revolutionary simultaneously.
China's involvement in Burundi, where it wanted to fish in troubled waters, brought no dividends either. Tutsi survivors of the I lutu revolt in Rwanda were plotting a counter-coup with their Burundi kinsmen. This had no grounds for ideological com munist support, but China backed the Tutsi expedition by training some Tutsi in Chinese forms of guerrilla warfare. Appalling massacres followed, and in Burundi, where Chinese meddling was viewed with suspicion, the government split into p ro and anti-Chinese factions. The anti-Chinese prime minister was murdered, and ru mours had it that the Chinese were involved. The whole episode ended with the closing of China's short-lived diplomatic mission.
Involvement in the Congo-Brazzaville was slightly more successful. This African country was among those who recognised Communist China when France pointed the way, and a treaty of friendship which included an aid programme followed. In 1966 a military coup put an end to all this.
During the Cultural Revolution (1966) (1967) (1968) China closed all its embassies except the one in Egypt. All diplomatic personnel was recalled for reform, and African students in China were sent home. Financial aid was cut back. After this, China's tactics changed, and it halted its efforts to create conflict between African states and the West. Instead China began to concentrate on outspoken anti-imperial states and institutions. China's most spectacular success came in Tanzania, one of Africa's most radical and anti-West ern states.
Communist China's relations with Tanzania date back to its independence and the army mutiny in 1964. Nycrere, who had to rely on British troops during this episode, turned to the Chinese to strengthen his army and the connection between the Tanzanian People's Army and China began. Hie two countries moved closer together, and after a visit to China, Nyerere was impressed by Chinese development programmes, which he regarded as suitable for Tanzania. A treaty of friendship was signed in 1965 and China's involvement in Tanzania's economy began in the following year. During the Cultural Revolution, China maintained relations with Tanzania, and in 1967 Nyerere introduced his version of Tanzanian socialism known as ujamaa'. This was an effort to change the lifestyle and production methods of Tanzania's peasants to one of communal cooper ation which had been inspired by the Chinese communes.
The Tazara railway -initially known as the Tanzam railway-was an even more spectacular manifestation of Chinese involvement in Africa. The railway was not a Chinese idea. In the days of European partition a line had been contemplated, and the Zambian president, Kenneth Kaunda, encouraged the idea of a railway connection with Dar es Salaam after his country had become independent, because this would have enabled Zambia to export its minerals directly. The International Bank for Reconstruc tion and Development and an economic mission of the UN turned down the idea as uneconomic before Zhou Enlai offered to build the line in 1964. Kaunda remained sceptical about the Chinese involvement: he preferred Anglo-Canadian investment, but when Rhodesia proclaimed UDI, his communication problems worsened and his re gard for the British decreased.
Work commenced in 1970, and despite several stumbling blocks the railway was completed in 1975, two years before schedule. It became the property of the two African countries, who had to pay for it by 1982; 52 percent of this debt had to be settled through the purchasing of Chinese products. This project, often portrayed as a model of foreign aid to Africa, soon ran into difficulties, though not of Chinese origin. Poor maintenance contributed to the decay while goods dogged at Dar es Salaam, and in 1978 Zambia had to turn to South Africa to help with the export of its copper. As a result, China's reputation suffered, and the ideological benefit derived from the construction was also minimal: the Tanzanians and Zambians protested against any Chinese ideological propaganda during the construction process.
Chinese successes were few and far between. China lacked air and shipping links with Africa, and mutual trade was negligible. Before the Cultural Revolution, diplomatic contact was modest, but after Communist China had attained membership of the UN, the position changed and it returned to Africa, stepping into the position that Taiwan had had to sacrifice -often where Communist China would have found it difficult to enter otherwise. These included pro-American states such as Ethiopia and Zaire and others such as Uganda and Somalia who did in fact benefit financially from Communist China's involvement. Small projects like rice cultivation in Guinea, Mali and Botswana count among the limited successes Communist China had in Africa.
Another form of propaganda is broadcasting, and China made use of Arabic broadcasts in Egypt at the time of the Suez crisis. Although the Chinese did not trail behind the Soviets in this respect, the content of their broadcasts was hollow, its main concern being to blacken the Soviets instead of promoting positive Chinese views. China's attempts at promoting a truly revolutionary influence failed; it simply backed the wrong groups. In Angola, for example, the Chinese backed all exept the MPLA. This did not discourage Castro, he merely changed his tactics, and in the spate of the many new presidencies and governments that took power in Africa, he set out to train security forces and bodyguards for them. This was done from Conakry and Brazzaville. Brazzaville became the home of the remnants of his abortive Congo expedition while Conakry, easily accessible from the Caribbean, not only had left-wing rulers, but was also suitably situated for involvement in Portuguese Guinea.
Anti-Portuguese activities became Cuba's main concern for the decade after 1964 when Che Guevara made his first contact with the MPI.A and the Partido Africano da Indcpendcnda da Guinee e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) in Guinea. During these years Cuba was also of some service to his hosts when he not only helped to foil a coup in the Congo-Brazzaville, but also organised an internal security service and personal body guard for Sekou Toure in Guinea. Eventually the Congo-Brazzaville leader was over thrown, but this setback was countered by the extension of Cuban services to Sierra Leone before Castro became involved in South Yemen, Oman and the Middle East against Israel. Events in Angola and Ethiopia eventually drew Cuba into the whirlpool of international politics in Africa with much more vigour.
During the Angolan war of liberation, the MPLA was regarded as a suitable leftist organisation to qualify for aid from Moscow. Because of lack of results, Moscow's backing began to dwindle, and in 1974 it was a mere trickle compared with the aid the rival liberation movement, the FLNA, received from various sources including Libya, Rumania, Zaire and China, who also helped the third liberation movement, Unita. After an initial Soviet and Cuban cutback, their involvement began to increase from 1977 when support was generally stepped up to reach a climax in October 1988. At this stage up to 60 000 Soviet-allied troops were in Angola. Involvement of this magnitude was necessary because of Unita's persistence and South Africa's continued success against Swapo insurgents, who were often pursued into southern Angola. The Reagan government's global strategy against communism during the 1980s was another con tributing factor.
In November 1983 the Soviets changed their attitude and warned South Africa against the extent of its direct and indirect involvement in Angola -they had prior knowledge of a major incursion South Africa was about to undertake into southern Angola. The Kremlin was equally concerned about Unita's successes against their client, the MPLA. Although Unita could not overcome the MPLA, its successes badly affected the Soviet prestige. Ihe result was an escalation of Soviet-Cuban involvement after January 1984, when the Cubans began to fly Angolan aircraft and improved arms and equipment appeared on the battle front. The new strategy was to wipe out Unita in a limited conventional war, but the combined Angolan-Cuban-Russian force failed to remove Unita from its headquarters at Jamba. Campaigns such as these were repeated every dry season after 1985, but when American anti-aircraft Sting missiles became available to Unita in 1986, Unita began to improve its position. In spite of mutual differences between Angola and its Cuban and Soviet allies, they agreed on action against South Africa and Unita. After a visit to Moscow in November 1987, Castro sent Cuba's best troops to Angola and the Cubans warned South Africa not to come to Unita's aid unless it was prepared to be attacked. On 10 December 1987 the Angolan president announced that these troops had started to patrol the border with South West Africa (Namibia) and they would engage the South Africans if they en countered them. Numerous Soviet and Vietnamese advisors moved to the south as what some claim to be the greatest land battle in southern African history began. In January 1988 more Cubans were thrown into the fray; they defeated South Africa, who then had no alternative other than the negotiating table.
In accords signed at the UN in December 1988, Angola's security was guaranteed, and the way was opened for Namibia's long-awaited independence. South African troops would withdraw from both Angola and Namibia while a timetable was set for a Cuban withdrawal from Angola.17 In 1990 this agreement was contravened by the Cubans, who launched another spring attack against Jamba, Unita's headquarters, but during 1990 the accords were put into effect -at the time when the backbone of the MPLA, the Soviet Union, itself began to crumble.
THE SUPERPOWERS AND AFRICA'S STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE
Africa's strategic significance involved it in international politics and complicated the continent's preference for non-alignment. North and Northeast Africa between the Algerian harbour town of Mers el-Kebir in the west and Mombasa in Kenya, as well as its hinterland, were deeply involved in superpower politics by the 1980s. Along the Mediterranean coast, Mers el-Kebir was of cardinal strategic importance. Ever since the days of the Turks, any power in control of that harbour controlled most of the Mediter ranean. After the Second World War the Americans had denoted a special geopolitical significance to the area.18 Another important strategic region in the Mediterranean was Suez, but control here afforded dominance of a more limited part of the Mediterranean and involved the interests of the North African states. Egypt's interests were bound to the cast as well as the Mediterranean while Morocco looked in the opposite direction towards the Atlantic Ocean and the western Mediterranean. Algeria, Tunisia and Libya were, as it were, caught in the middle of this region.
Since the Second World War, Morocco had been under American influence whereas Nasser's Egypt was much more closely involved with the Soviet Union -as suggested by the Russo-F.gyptian Entente of the 1950s, which gave the Russians some facilities at Alexandria. This was seen as a potential threat to the West, but it did not prevent the
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United States from controlling the eastern Mediterranean in much the same way as in the western region of that ocean. After Nasser's death, neither Anwar el-Sadat nor Husni Mubarak sustained as close a relationship with the Soviets as Nasser did.
In the Maghrib, Algeria, radicalised by the war of liberation, embarked on a leftist socialist course, but refused to become a puppet of the Kremlin. Algeria regarded its relations with the Soviet Union as no more than friendly. Relations with France were also cordial and correct, especially after the French evacuated Mers el-Kebir in 1968, nine years earlier than had been specified in the peace treaty of 1962, which ended the war between Algeria and France. Morocco was Algeria's main foreign concern, and in 1963 war broke out as a result of a border dispute. Their hostility was of a territorial and economic nature, while ideology and history played a role too. 1 Iassan II, the king of Morocco, ruled very autocratically, and this was unacceptable in socialist Algeria. Conflicting claims to mineral riches in the region also added to the unpleasantness and Algeria supported the Polisario Front in the former Spanish Rio de Oro.
Despite Libya's claims of non-alignment and the fact that local circumstances dictated matters, Libya followed a far stronger foreign policy than Algeria. Libya distrusted Egypt because Nasser harboured ideas of incorporating the area into the Egyptian fold and his successor, Sadat, who came to power a year after Muammar al-Qadhafi's coup in Libya, was hostile towards the kind of socialism Qadhafi preferred.
Qadhafi soon took steps that did not endear him to other powers who had interests in the region. The Americans were expelled from a base which his predecessor, King Idris, had granted to them; he gave obvious support to subversive movements where he could; he changed Libya into the biggest harbinger of Russian arms outside Eastern Europe; he intervened in the Chadian dvil war and created the notion that he was building a Muslim empire that would stretch as far as Sudan, Zaire and Gabun. All of this was based on the income Libya attained from its only source, oil, which is extremely vulnerable in a fluctuating market. During the seventies this market flourished, but in the 1980s the position changed, prices dropped and the Oil Producing and Export Countries (Opec) cut back on output and prices to stabilise the market. Qadhafi was caught off-balance and began to run short of cash, jeopardising his development projects.
Qadhafi blamed the USA for his misfortunes, and also accused the Americans, Egyp tians and Sudan of involvement in an aborted coup against his regime early in 1981. With relations already strained, tension heightened when the Americans shot down two Libyan planes over the Gulf of Sirte in August, but after the assassination of Sadat in October, relations were better. Despite some success against the rivals of his friend Goukouni Oueddei, Qadhafi withdrew his forces from Chad. He was experiencing serious economic problems and shifted the blame for this from the Americans and the Egyptians to the Americans and the Saudis who purportedly glutted the market with oil to make the Libyan product unsaleable. To the Reagan administration, who put a high premium on anti-communist actions globally, Libya was the home of world terrorism, which not only threatened world peace, but made him a tool in the hands of
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Moroc co the Kremlin. The Soviets, however, adopted an amenable attitude towards Qadhafi. They remained aloof from his socialist ideas, but were willing to supply him with arms for cash. When Qadhafi ran out of money the Soviets became less accommodating and Qadhafi, lagging on payments, was anxious to negotiate a revised deal. Moscow was in no mood for this and insisted on payment. This was possibly because they attached no specific value to his allegiance, or because they feared an open onslaught from the United States, something which in all probability they would have liked to avoid. An empty-handed Qadhafi turned to China in 1982 while his relations with the United States continued to deteriorate. This antagonism was also extended to include Britainespecially after Libyan diplomats had killed a British policewoman during riots at the Libyan embassy in London. To the Americans, Qadhafi was the source of world terrorism and they would have liked nothing better than to bring about his fall. In April 1986 Libyan-American hostility led to the bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi with the compliance of Britain and America's Nato allies. This failed to remove Qadhafi from power and he turned to more discreet acts of terrorism. 
Soviet
This involved the Israelis, who wanted to see the Red Sea coast under friendly Ethiopiprotec-^ r u l e . More than half of the Eritreans were Muslim and the danger was that they could torate w ^ Arabs a n d impede Israeli shipping at the southern Israeli port of Eilat. The Ethiopians enjoyed the support of the United States and some of its friends. As the war escalated the Eritreans, with support from Cuba, Libya, South Yemen and Saudi Arabia, overcame their differences. By 1977-1978 they threatened the regime in Addis Ababa. Then the Kremlin stepped in with massive reinforcements. They forced the Cubans to change sides and South Yemen and Libya withdrew from the struggle. This turned the tide against Eritrea and the central government in Ethiopia became a Soviet protector ate.
Effect
These Russian successes did not affect the position of the United States in the Indian upon US Ocean, where it had taken control from the British in about 1971 with the construction of a naval base on Diego Garcia. Ih e Soviet fleet, which functioned from Vladivostok, was no match for the Americans and the use of satellite communication, the takeover In the eighties the Russians centred their attention on Ethiopia. Ethiopian dependence on the Soviets was related to its need for Russian arms, a position which would change only if Ethiopia could come to some agreement with Somalia and Eritrea. The Ameri cans had vested interests in Somalia and Kenya, where there was an intractable border dispute, and also in Djibouti, where the population was divided in loyalty towards Somalia and Ethiopia. Both superpowers were therefore in positions beset with difficul ties -a situation which they accepted because of the region's strategic importance in the relentless struggle for global dominance.
MINERALS AND AFRICA'S STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE
In Africa the regions where strategic minerals are found are situated mainly in the southern but also in the northwestern part of the continent. The value of strategic minerals (including oil and mineral ores) is not confined to possible military signific ance; they are much sought after for peaceful purposes by both capitalist and commun ist countries. Countries in possession of such minerals have some economic power but are exposed to the attention of outside powers which is not always to their benefit. The former Eastern European countries were more interested in Africa's minerals than the Soviets. Countries such as Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania and especially Eastern Germany had invested large sums of money in these undertakings and had also negotiated many treaties of economic cooperation and joint enterprises to exploit these minerals. This was done primarily through Comecon, of which Mozambique became the first African associate in 1978. The Soviet Union's attitude was different because it did not depend on Africa's minerals. To the Soviets these minerals had secondary strategic significance: they preferred the termination of these exports to Nato countries whereas the African states benefited through increased exports to the Western countries. The United States is the Western state which is most dependent on these products, but neither it nor its Nato partners really feared that the African states would cut their supply in a crisis. Local unrest in Africa was a more serious obstacle. The war in Morocco could influence phosphate and iron ore supplies but it affected all potential clients, both communist and capitalist.
Zaire, one of the sole suppliers of cobalt to the United States, is of special significance. When rebels in Shaba occupied a mine which generated half the world's output of cobalt in 1978, the price of the commodity quadrupled. This disturbance induced foreign intervention on two occasions: internal revolts were put down because of threats to the flow of minerals to Western countries and the lives of Europeans. Moroccan troops, using American arms, French aircraft and Saudian money, saved Belgians and Germans whose lives were in jeopardy. French and Belgian paratroopers repeated this exercise during a second revolt a year later. France continued to recognise Africa's importance in world politics after decolonisa tion. It actually set an example in dealing with Africa which the superpowers later followed. Although the former French federal blocs had been dissolved at inde pendence, they were reconstituted into an economic union with the former mother country, which strengthened ties between them. France linked them with the European Economic Community (EEC), which provided economic aid, and 18 of these states shared in the EEC development fund from 1964. In exchange for this, French troops remained in Africa from Senegal in the west to Djibouti in the east. In the early 1980s, the Ministry for Cooperation and Development dispensed aid in expectation of in creased French influence and exports. Paris was made the centre for meetings between African leaders and all the presidents of the Fifth Republic visited the continent at various times. As pointed out above, Zaire was helped twice; aid was also given to save pro-French governments in the Cameroon and Gabon in the 1960s. Africa remained important from the French point of view, because France regarded its influence in sub-Saharan Africa as proof of its claim to world power status/
In Chad the French did not hesitate to become involved. When Africa's largest and poorest state became independent in 1960, the nomadic Muslim pastoralists of the north were dominated by the agriculturally oriented Christians of the south. Uprisings soon followed in the north and east because of heavy taxation and anti-Muslim discrimina tion. In 1964 a one-party system was introduced. This was the forerunner of dvil war, because all attempts to reach some sort of understanding with the Muslims failed. By 1967 the north was in open rebellion, which escalated into warfare three years later. After Qadhafi came into power in Libya, he began to intervene in Chadian affairs mainly because he had designs on a piece of borderland which Benito Mussolini had annexed to Libya in earlier years and which was rumoured to be rich in uranium. In 1973 Qadhafi sdzed the land after efforts to buy it from Chad had failed. Six years later Goukouni Queddei, a northern Muslim, came to power in Chad and dedded to unite with Libya. This sparked a new dvil war. Anti-Qadhafian powers, with Egyptian and Sudanese support, were eventually victorious before Queddei entered the struggle again from Libya. End ot Superpower rivalry in Africa came to an end with the demise of the communist bloc rivalry and dwindling American interest in the early 1990s. African foreign policy, or the foreign policies of 52 African states, can no longer rely on the global struggle of the superpowers to obtain arms or any form of foreign aid from them. Western capital and technology found a 'new frontier' in Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Inde pendent States which threw off the communist yoke and opted for a market economy and democracy. Africa's economy has been damaged by its own graft, mismanagement, misrule and ineptitude and the West has become disenchanted with the continent. In the UN anti-colonialism has lost its verve -as has the anti-apartheid drive with the decline of the National Party government in South Africa. In the last decade of the century the African states can only try to focus the attention of the international community upon the continent's economic plight"4 because non-alignment, at least between East and West, is no longer relevant.
